An analysis of the conflagration in Trondheim in 2002

The fire in Trondheim December 7th 2002

How could flames from a deep-fryer just around the corner from the fire station end in a fire destroying almost an entire block?

The fire started Saturday morning approx 10.35 a.m., and the fire station was notified at 10.45 a.m.; in effect ten minutes subsequent to the start of the fire.

The fire started instantaneously with up to two meters high flames in a deep-fryer in the kitchens of the restaurants News/Rick’s. The fire was allegedly put out using a portable extinguisher, probably a dry chemical extinguisher, but reignited shortly after. This was due to the fact that the vegetable oil had reached its auto ignition temperature , i.e. 370 ºC.

The flames reached the ventilation cowl above the pan. The fire diverged from there to a ventilation room; an extension  built on the roof above the kitchen, and from there to the next floor and to the attic storey.

The conflagration is a fact.

Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory was carrying out a project for the National Office of Building Technology and Administration (BE) at the time. The aim was to gather and analyse important information from actual fires. Two days after the fire BE and NBL decided to include this fire in the project in order to learn as much as possible from the conflagration.
The report "Investigation of the major fire in Trondheim 7 December 2002." (in Norwegian only) include the resumé and conclusions from the investigation.

It is difficult to put out a deep-fat fire not having the correct extinguisher, and using the wrong approach.  In fact the fire may even get worse, and the risk of spontaneous ignition is increasing.  It is recommended to use an extinguishment system mounted rigidly, covering the pan, cowl and ventilation duct.

According to the Building Code the ventilation room should have been built of noncombustible material designed to endure fire for 60 minutes.  However the room was not built according to regulations.  The walls, roof and floor were made of wood.

The ventilation room and the ventilation system had been gradually enlarged over the years.   This may be the reason why the requirements in the building code were not followed.  If the room had been built of noncombustible material and according to regulations,  the fire would probably not have spread to the ventilation room.

We have learned from earlier cases in Norway and from this fire in Trondheim that it is necessary to show more respect for regulations, requirements and instructions, and that the fire brigade and the building authorities must show more muscles. Both the regulatory body and the controlling body have to be far more strict when requirements and instructions are imposed and not followed.

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